

WRITING THE LAST CHAPTER FIRST:

OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS AND THE 'STEADY STATE'

by

James F. Jamison
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marines

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

13 May 2002

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): WRITING THE LAST CHAPTER FIRST: OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS AND THE 'STEADY STATE'			
9. Personal Authors: James F. Jamison, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marines			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 13 May 2002	
12. Page Count: 18 12A Paper Advisor: Lieutenant Colonel C. Joseph Dill, USAF			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: War Termination, Peace Settlement, Limited War, Campaign Planning, Transformation, Joint Doctrine, Principles of War, Operational Art, Operational Factors, Grenada			
15. Abstract: In limited wars the operational problem most often encountered and yet not fully addressed is that of translating military success that results in favorable war termination into steady long-term peace. This often results from the use of military forces with just lip service to war termination conditions, post-hostilities activities, and most importantly, achievement of an end state as opposed to a 'steady' state. Even though end state considerations are addressed throughout joint doctrine, Operational Commanders tend to center their plans on war termination and exit strategy at the expense of the longer-term conditions needed to enable the steady state. By evaluating the JTF's planned conditions in context of the pillars of the bridge from war to peace, Operational Commanders can avoid creating military conditions counter to those needed to establish and maintain the steady state.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

Security Classification of This Page Unclassified

ABSTRACT
FOR
WRITING THE LAST CHAPTER FIRST:
OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS AND THE ‘STEADY STATE’

In limited wars the operational problem most often encountered and yet not fully addressed is that of translating military success that results in favorable war termination into steady long-term peace. This often results from the use of military forces with just lip service to war termination conditions, post-hostilities activities, and most importantly, achievement of an end state as opposed to a steady state. A steady state is “the rest of the story;” months or years after the limited war concludes. Even though end state considerations are addressed throughout joint doctrine, Operational Commanders tend to center their plans on war termination and exit strategy at the expense of the longer-term conditions needed to enable the steady state. By evaluating the JTF’s planned conditions in context of supporting the bridge from war to peace, and focusing resources in areas of influence, Operational Commanders can avoid creating military conditions counter to those needed to establish and maintain the steady state.

WRITING THE LAST CHAPTER FIRST:

OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS AND THE 'STEADY STATE'

The idea of a sure-fire pre-hostilities road map to post-hostilities military extrication is a delusion. Having a concept of success is always good, but having a healthy appreciation of the difficulties of maintaining it in the face of war's vicissitudes is even better.ⁱ

Jeffery Record

Last Chapter Written First

As Operational Commandersⁱⁱ execute plans to defeat the enemy and terminate the war they also may create conditions that are at odds with the state of affairs required for a stable peace. Joint Publication 3-0 tells us, "Termination should be considered from the outset of planning."ⁱⁱⁱ In other words, before starting into a conflict we ought to plan how it will end. As important as this concept is, however, there is more than just the "end" for which Operational Commanders must plan. War termination and stable peace, often used interchangeably, are actually two separate and distinct milestones on the road to victory.^{iv} Operational Commanders can achieve the former while also dooming the latter. While applying their judgment to joint doctrine, they ought to focus effort on areas that can best affect a limited war's final result.

As he assesses the strategic goal, the Operational Commander is counseled to answer five questions, the first of which is, "What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal?"^v The most important conditions to terminate the conflict are military, yet the most important conditions to make the strategic goal possible are the ones contained inside 'Question One's' parenthesis -- the political and social. The conditions, when taken together, look suspiciously like the Clausewitzian triangle -- the military, the government (political), and the people (social).^{vi} The Operational Commander should use

joint doctrine as a base upon which to make plans, select military objectives and take action; while applying his judgment to set conditions for the stable peace.

When 'Question One' is not completely answered before, and refined during hostilities, the Operational Commander will be behind the pace of the operation; he risks not only unbalancing the Clausewitzian triangle but also relegates himself to playing catch up when the conflict transforms to post-hostilities, and beyond. The challenge is to not only recognize the full range of the conditions he must 'produce,' but also identify those conditions he must 'preserve' or 'protect' in order to achieve the strategic goal. Moreover, as important as producing conditions is to a stable peace, not producing unintended, or intended but shortsighted, conditions that are counter to the ultimate strategic goal is equally critical to success. This paper will examine how Operational Commanders might approach these challenges.

Scope and Roadmap

The scope of this paper will be restricted to the considerations that Operational Commanders make to ensure conditions for a stable peace when planning and executing limited wars.^{vii} The paper begins by proposing seven phases of limited war (divided into three stages) and then examines the bridge^{viii} between military plans and operations and the achievement of strategic objectives (see Appendix A). Selected key judgment pillars necessary to support that bridge, the apex of which represents the transformation of conflict to peace, are discussed. These four key pillars help guide the Operational Commander's judgment beyond fire and maneuver, allowing him to shape the stable peace even as the conflict rages. The four pillars are: 1) Recognition of the transformational nature of moving from conflict to peace; 2) The distinction between capabilities and will of the enemy; 3) The gap between war termination and peace settlement; and finally and most importantly, 4) The difference between an end state and a steady state.

Following the identification of key judgment pillars is a discussion of the critical planning areas upon which Operational Commanders should focus to produce, preserve, and/or protect conditions for successful steady states. These areas of influence include but certainly are not limited to: information, infrastructure, and leadership. Examples from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, POWER PACK^{ix}, JUST CAUSE, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY will be cited for illustration. Finally, the paper concludes by considering counterarguments, drawing conclusions, and making recommendations focused on joint doctrine.

Phases of Limited War^x:

While phases of limited war (see Appendix A) are not absolute, they are described here to give the reader a sense of chronological progression. The final stage, the steady state, directly supports this paper's thesis.

FIRST CONFRONTATION PHASE: The initiating phase of a limited war is called the confrontation phase. It takes at least two sides to make a confrontation. Confrontation occurs when two groups' objectives are not compatible. It is not fought militarily but is often waged at the polls, in the courts, in the media, in the UN and other diplomatic arenas, economically—any way but militarily.

PRE-HOSTILITY PHASE: The first phase of the conflict stage of limited war, the pre-hostility phase begins when any of the potential belligerents decides on, or introduces, the military alternative. A threshold has been crossed to the second phase in which the use of armed force has become potentially likely or at least reasonably expected. This may include a show of force, movement of military units, increased levels of readiness, partial mobilization, etc. One or both, parties regard the confrontation in military terms. The introduction of a military alternative means only that the possibility exists that hostilities may begin soon; often the introduction of the military alternative may only be a bluff.

HOSTILITIES PHASE: As the belligerents' Clausewitzian triangles become more ensconced in the strategic objectives and the possibility of compromise decreases, the conflict may transform, intentionally or accidentally, into hostilities. Often thought of as standing alone, the hostilities phase^{xi} is actually framed by two other phases in the conflict stage: pre-hostilities, and post-hostilities. During the hostilities phase armed conflict occurs to achieve military objectives. Because of the intense military activity that normally characterizes the hostilities phase, Operational Commanders can have their greatest influence on the final phase – the steady state – while embroiled in combat.

POST-HOSTILITIES: Regardless of the reason – whether one of the adversaries either loses the will and/or capability to continue the limited war -- once

hostilities are terminated the conflict transforms into the fourth phase, post-hostilities. Conventionally this phase is started with what is loosely called “war termination.” During the post-hostility phase the conflict may well continue, but the fighting is, at least temporarily, suspended.^{xii}

CONCLUDING CONFRONTATION PHASE: The concluding confrontation phase is the first of three in the peace settlement stage. In this block on the continuum of limited war the military alternative has been abandoned but there are still issues in dispute. They may or may not be the same issues that characterized the initial confrontation phase. The nature of this phase depends in large part upon the outcome of the hostilities, and more importantly, on the actions the Operational Commander planned and executed during the four prior phases.

SETTLEMENT PHASE: Settlement, the sixth and next to final phase, has been elusive. When achieved, settlement results in the desired end state^{xiii} – a snapshot of the situation the highest political leadership wants upon completion of military and military support missions. If the Operational Commander has ignored the steady state focus areas in his planning and execution during the first five phases, the confrontation may cycle back to the beginning of the process. The seeds of the next conflict are often sown here, and the steady state, which is often the heart of the strategic objective, is never achieved. This is especially true if the Operational Commander exercises his military options with little regard for non-military effects.

STEADY STATE: The final phase, steady state, is the “rest of the story.” It is the long-term state of affairs in the post-war region. The achievement of the desired end state begins this phase, however the stable state is what the affected region looks like months, and even years, after the limited war has concluded. If the desired end state is the situation when “...operations conclude,” then the steady state is the beginning and continuation of relative harmony between the belligerents resulting in what Clausewitz might have described as “final victory.” Until the steady state is achieved, the long view will reveal that nothing is won, nothing is lost, and nothing is decided.^{xiv}

Operational Commanders, with joint doctrine as their base, should apply their judgment to key pillars that support the bridge from conflict to the steady state. Although not a complete list, the following considerations should be applied within the context of limited war.

Transition versus Transformation^{xv}

The seven phases above could lead readers to believe that limited wars follow an iterative, predictable path. This is generally not the case; the phases are provided to give structure to the argument that the last chapter should be written first. While the transition from war to peace should be planned and executed, its true transformational nature should never be detached from the

Operational Commander's thought process. The post-hostilities phase of a conflict is traditionally thought of as a transition from war to peace; however, it is actually a transformation.

Transition is the "process of changing from one state, form or activity to another."^{xvi}

Transformation on the other hand, involves the actual change, not the process, in the "nature" of things. Post-hostilities transitional considerations are easily categorized in our joint doctrine. Joint Pub 3-0 is testament to how the transition process can provide a roadmap for the Operational Commander. The process gives structure, yet the underlying truth is that the change from hostilities to post-hostilities is a transformation. If this transformation does not occur, "the conflict can become latent, giving the appearance of termination without actually ending."^{xvii}

The transformational nature of hostilities to the post-hostilities phase is seen clearly at the end of the Gulf War. Even President Bush did not recognize the transformational shift when in March 1991 he said, "The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity that surprised us all, and we were perhaps unprepared psychologically for the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking."^{xviii}

Operational Commanders can sometimes focus too much on the actions the military take (warfare) and their effect on the enemy's military capability and miss the effect those actions have on the non-military sources of power of the enemy (war). There is a gulf of difference between warfare and war. War is fought using all instruments of national power – economic, political, military, and informational. Warfare is really a subset of war as it is primarily the realm of the military and armed action. The military campaign will ultimately risk collapse however, if it is not a part of a larger campaign involving all sources of national power. An Operational Commander's lack of appreciation for the military effects on non-military entities could result in failure to achieve political or strategic objectives of the military effort, loss of the hearts and minds of the populace, unfavorable response from the world community, and the undesired requirement for long-term presence of forces in the area of operation.^{xix}

War Termination and Peace Settlement

War termination is a regrettable term – wars don't terminate as much as they change in their nature. This is particularly clear in unlimited war; the change is usually obvious. Limited wars however, are characterized by not only the need to address the termination of war by eliminating the enemy's capability to fight, but equally importantly by eroding his will to fight. War termination must also be accompanied by the "restoration of order prior to the reconstruction of infrastructure." ^{xx}

The blurring of the war termination and peace settlement line has resulted in an environment where "conflict termination and conflict resolution are terms that are used interchangeably throughout the military. The criteria for success in conflict have generally equated to victory."^{xxi} Unfortunately, the view of many strategists parallels the traditional military's criteria for success in a conflict. "The use of force on an opponent will not, on its own, cause an opponent to transform."^{xxii} An opponent may agree to terminate a limited war, but the strategic goal is rarely found in the stoppage of fighting alone. The peace settlement stage encompasses the second confrontation, settlement and steady state phases (see Appendix A). This peace settlement stage is different from, but dependent on the war termination, as it cannot start until hostilities transform to post-hostilities. It is a beginning not an end, and when properly arrived at, it will define the exit strategy.

Michael Handel wrote, "Simply put, achievements on the battlefield can only be consolidated through a concerted political and diplomatic effort that makes the outcome acceptable to the defeated side."^{xxiii} In limited war, acceptability is key to the accomplishment of the peace settlement, and hence the success of the exit strategy.

Capabilities and Will

“War is a function of two primary elements: will for war and capability for war.”^{xxiv} It is not the achievement of the victor’s military goals in war that are necessary for a steady state, but rather the acknowledgement by the vanquished that the conflict has indeed ended. Operational Commanders often spend the majority of their time and effort addressing the enemy’s capabilities, naturally so. But neutralizing or eliminating those capabilities fails to address the strength of the opponent’s will, which is much harder to identify than his capabilities.

Military power directed primarily at an enemy’s capability without consideration of its effect on his will can contribute to losing a war in two ways. First, “The application of combat power without regard to civilian sensibilities will alienate the populace, which alone has the power to provide the government victory in the war for political legitimacy.”^{xxv} Second, “The failure to provide security to the government and the people, incapacitates the government’s ability to deliver basic services and weakens political legitimacy.”^{xxvi}

Thus it is the defeated, more than the victorious, that determines if a steady state will result. If one of the belligerents in a conflict calculates the value of the object as worth the magnitude and duration of their sacrifices, the war will continue as long as capabilities remain. It thus falls to the Operational Commander to not only win the battle, but also set the conditions which allow a peace following the war termination. As Carl Von Clausewitz warns, “... even the ultimate military outcome of a war is not to be regarded as final.” He goes on to explain:

The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.^{xxvii}

End State Versus Steady State

When taken together, war termination and stable peace should result in more than the end state. Operational Commanders should look to create a steady state – the end state is a milestone

on the road to the steady state, which is a beginning, not an end. It is more important to set the conditions for long-term stability than to focus on short-term military objectives outside the context of the final phase in limited war. Michael Handel observed:

Technological and material victories are inseparable from the political and ‘strategic’ dimensions, but in the final analysis they are at best only a necessary but rarely sufficient condition for a final and complete victory.^{xxviii}

The abrupt end of the Gulf war provides an excellent example of operational decisions that caused a condition counter to those that could have led the conflict to the steady state. General Schwarzkopf made a decision to allow the Iraqis to operate their helicopters to give the Iraqis an efficient way to supply their people with food, water, and other necessities while infrastructure was being repaired. At face value it made sense, but in terms of creating conditions that would result in a steady state, it was a disastrous decision. Rather than using the helicopters for humanitarian logistics, the Iraqi military used them to brutally quell uprisings that may have toppled Saddam Hussein – a condition that arguably could have led to a steady state.

Conflict is terminated when either an opponent’s will to wage war or his capabilities are diminished to the point where he can no longer sustain the conflict. If a stable peace is not reached at this critical point, the enemy’s will may smolder undetected until his capabilities can be rebuilt – and conflict resumes again. It is significant that the “confrontation phase” occurs twice in the phases of limited war, once in the beginning and once just before settlement.^{xxix} The Operational Commander’s challenge is to connect what he should plan for in the first confrontation phase in order to influence the settlement that comes after the second. If he waits to address the conditions beyond the first confrontation phase he risks missing the underlying causes of the limited war and may not have enough time to figure out what conditions need to be produced, preserved, and or protected, if the end state is to evolve into a steady state.

Infrastructure, Leadership, and Information

The phases of limited war provide a framework for operational planners to devise courses of action (COA) and tasks. The goal in the hostilities phase is to execute a COA that turns military victory into a lasting steady state of affairs in the final phase. Armed with the pillars previously identified, planners should turn these key judgment factors into concrete actions. Those actions should be taken within the context of the overall campaign to complement the effects of the other sources of national power that are often heavily focused on the post-hostilities phase during limited war. Key areas of influence include, but are not limited to, infrastructure (both physical and social), leadership, and information – they provide the Operational Commander foci during the first phases of limited war to ensure success during the final phase, the steady state.

Infrastructure. It has been argued that the planning for war termination must include planning for post-hostilities.^{xxx} That is too late. While joint doctrine also reflects this concept, the Operational Commander can't wait until plans for war termination to initiate the planning for the steady state. Joint Pub 5.2.20 notes several planning considerations; one of which is, "The extent of devastation and the potential of the defeated government to regain its place in the family of nations."^{xxxi} In actuality, it would be better if the Operational Commander did more than simply "consider" the extent of the devastation in formulating his post-hostilities plans. He should take positive steps to "influence" the degree and type of devastation, as they will have far-reaching effects on the stability of the region.

By writing the "last chapter first," Operational Commanders can anticipate what physical infrastructure requirements will be necessary when hostilities transform to post-hostilities. In limited war, even if overwhelming force is used, self-control and restraint are key to avoiding infrastructure damage in the hostilities phase that will doom the progress towards the steady state in the post-hostilities phase. This is particularly critical in economic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, civil communications, and urban hubs. An Operational Commander in limited war should

consider denying the enemy the use of militarily useful physical infrastructure by other means than merely destruction.

The second type of infrastructure the Operational Commander should consider during the early phases in order to achieve the steady state, is social. The social mores and fabric of a region are a stabilizing force. The Red Cross has for decades provided us with a template for the non-military conditions the Operational Commander should plan to produce, preserve or protect if the victory he achieves on the battlefield is to be transformed into a steady state. The Red Cross utilizes core principles as they conduct their operations.^{xxxii} While arguably vague, they are at the heart of the social, and economic conditions the Operational Commander should attempt to produce, or avoid destroying, to ensure his military operations and military support operations result in conditions that facilitate a steady state. By understanding and applying these principles in parallel with those joint doctrine principles of MOOTW, the Operational Commander can reduce the animosity and retribution factors that can often re-ignite a limited war after the desired end state has been reached and the military forces are redeployed.

This point is well illustrated in the successful 1965-66 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, Operation POWER PACK. Lawrence A. Yates writes, “If restraint provided the key to a political solution to the crisis, discipline provided the key to restraint.”^{xxxiii} U.S. troops and their efforts brought a degree of security and fairness to the populace ensuring that thousands more would not join the 3,000 Dominicans killed prior to the intervention. For this, most of the population of Santo Domingo was grateful. While not all the grievances that started the Dominican civil war were addressed in the settlement phase, the reduction in animosity achieved by the U.S. military’s even-handedness “... helped set the stage for twenty years of relative peace.”^{xxxiv}

Leadership. In limited war, the strategic goal often involves the restoration of legitimate rule, not necessarily a complete scuttling of the existing lower level leadership – the people who

run the country's bureaucracy and provide for basic services. In many cases, such as UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, where a critical requisite for senior (and desirably legitimate) leadership to replace the offending leaders exists, it is easy to forget the role of mid-level leaders. As President Aristide was returned to power, he pledged, with the full support and encouragement of CINCUSACOM, Admiral Miller, that his restored government would be balanced. He gave existing factional leadership key roles in his cabinet and elsewhere, in large part to ensure the potentially divisive factions in Haiti would be part of the steady state, not adversaries in it.

Regressive planning that starts with the "last chapter first" -- the steady state -- often depends on the existing bureaucratic leadership. Operation JUST CAUSE provides an example of how not to plan for post-hostilities and the steady state. Plans for post-hostility civil-military operations, dubbed BLIND LOGIC, were based on an overly optimistic assessment of the Panamanian Government's viability and lacked an interagency focus. The plans were initially ignored in favor of the Operational Commander's focus on hostilities.^{xxxv} Even so, within two days of combat operations, widespread looting forced the urgent need to restore the basic government services that support the social infrastructure. BLIND LOGIC was intensely reworked, and with the Operational Commander's approval, was forwarded up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY.^{xxxvi} This successful post-hostilities operation, although late in its initial execution, leveraged the existing Panamanian leadership and bureaucracies, eventually producing the "steady state" Panama enjoys today.

The concerted efforts to fill the leadership void during current operations in Afghanistan acknowledge the importance of the leadership area of influence. The return of the King and the tight physical security afforded the interim Afghani President, underscores this principle.

Information.^{xxxvii} Operational Commanders will, by virtue of the requirements of combat, be in possession of vast amounts of information -- information that often is critical to post-hostilities return to order. Without violating the principle of security, Operational Commanders should find

ways to disseminate the information to the populace. From the Operational Commander's perspective, dissemination of information has effects in three ways: reinforcing loyalty of friendly forces, "turning" of enemy forces, and primarily, winning "the support for the effort from a largely uncommitted or only marginally supportive population."^{xxxviii}

During Operation URGENT FURY, the JTF Commander found himself in possession of information about the status of foreign students, transportation, and utilities that was in great demand by the population.^{xxxix} By disseminating that information to the locals via his forces, he accomplished two important objectives. First, the JTF enjoyed an enhanced legitimacy – some have argued even achieved "heroic status" as the brave but benign protector. Second, the seeds for the steady state (which began eighteen months after the first Marines landed in the predawn darkness at Pearls) were sown with this overture for civil-military cooperation. If the internal information distribution was a success, the external was a disaster. General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the invasion, noted in retrospect that a huge mistake was made by, "...failing to find a way to take some press along. We missed a great opportunity to have the American people get reports about how well the Rangers and Marines operated."^{xl}

The information the Operational Commander possesses during the post-hostilities phase has been gathered during the four previous phases of limited war – the normal result of the intelligence cycle in action. As such, a concerted effort should be made to rapidly declassify information needed by the populace without compromising force protection.

Importantly, information is directed both internally, regionally, domestically, and internationally. The challenge the Operational Commander has, is to ensure each of those four "versions" is nested, complimentary, and the truth. The information directed internally and regionally during the last three phases of a limited war – concluding confrontation, settlement, and

steady state – plays a sometimes understated, but very critical role in the achievement of “final victory.”

Timely, truthful information in limited war is also required externally to the region in conflict. When the Operational Commander provides that information without breaching his own operational security, he can enhance the operations’ legitimacy. Information management is a capability to be resourced during each of the phases of limited war. The Operational Commander can only use this resource if it is not tainted or biased; otherwise he damages the operation’s credibility and lessens his effectiveness during the final three phases of limited war – the time when his credibility is most important. By ensuring all information and news releases are “told with full regard for the truth”^{xli} and providing assistance to the media and other users, the Operational Commander will be rewarded, over time, with respect which naturally leads to the ability to effectively “tell any side of the story.”^{xlii}

Counterargument

The literature of war termination is rife with references to the fundamental difference between winning the war and winning the peace. The argument implies they are two separate entities – the first controlled primarily by the “soldier” and the latter by the “statesman,” each supporting the other during their time in the lead role as the continuum of conflict develops. This notion has merit as it uses appropriate power sources during the phases of limited war, to influence the movement between phases and the final outcome. The argument further points to the well codified process that joint doctrine presents as testimony to the transitional, iterative nature of conflict and its resolution. While the mechanics in the doctrine are valid and relevant, they describe a transition process to manage a transformation. It is the Operational Commander that uses his judgment to ensure the process is suited to the transformational nature of limited war.

This paper emphasizes the Operational Commander's role in creating the bridge from war to peace far above that of the Diplomat's, thus risking accusation of being too "mil-centric" or discounting the diplomatic source of national power. If war is indeed the continuation of politics by other means as Carl Von Clausewitz has asserted and many have argued, why has such short shrift been given to the Diplomat? A convincing argument can be made that the Diplomat should have the dominant role in realizing the Nation's aims. At the strategic level that is true; however, this paper asserts that the Operational Commander is best positioned to regressively plan and execute the military actions needed to achieve his operational objectives in order to reach the strategic goal.

Conclusion

In limited wars the operational problem most often encountered and yet not fully addressed is that of translating military success that results in favorable war termination into steady long-term peace. This often results from the use of military forces with just lip service to war termination conditions, post-hostilities activities, and most importantly, achievement of an end state as opposed to a 'steady' state. Even though end state considerations are addressed throughout joint doctrine, Operational Commanders tend to center their plans on war termination and exit strategy at the expense of the longer-term conditions needed to enable the steady state. By evaluating the JTF's planned conditions in context of the "pillars of the bridge," and focusing resources (question "five") in areas of influence, Operational Commanders can avoid creating military conditions counter to those needed to establish and maintain the steady state.

Recommendations

First, joint doctrine should fully reflect the comprehensive model of regressive planning beyond the end state to include the steady state. Appendix B contains recommended changes to

selected keystone joint doctrine publications that may clarify the Operational Commander's critical role in writing the "last chapter first" by considering the long-term conditions he should produce, preserve, and/or protect to achieve the steady state.

Second, 'Question One' should be expanded to ensure that Operational Commanders' assessment of the strategic goal includes more than conditions that "...must be produced." In doing so, he should focus effort on those military, and related political and social, conditions that not only must be produced, but those that must be preserved and protected:

Proposed Question One: What military, and related political and social, conditions must be produced, preserved, and/or protected in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

Finally, the key judgment pillars discussed herein should guide the operational staff and decision makers while conducting net assessment, developing plans, and executing operations to regressively chart the military and military support requirements to achieve the strategic goal. Operational Commanders are charged with using their judgment in the application of joint doctrine. It is not good enough to simply achieve the end state (the snap shot at the conclusion of military operations), declare victory, and redeploy home. The thrust of this paper is that Operational Commanders first consider the state of affairs that is desired long after the military forces are gone. Long-term military conditions, as well as non-military conditions caused by military activity, will often be the principle determiners of the quality of the steady state, and ultimately whether Clausewitz's "final victory" is achieved.

ENDNOTES

ⁱ Jeffrey Record, "Exit Strategies Delusions," Parameters, (Winter 2001/2002): 21.

ⁱⁱ Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare (Newport, RI: Naval War College 2000), 640. In this paper an Operational Commander is defined as a joint or service component/functional commander who applies the tenets of operational art in accomplishing assigned military objectives in limited war. The accomplishment of those military goals is one element of the ultimate achievement of the strategic goal.

ⁱⁱⁱ Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, Sep 2001, I-11.

^{iv} James F. Jamison, "Strategic Outcomes," (Unpublished paper, Newport, RI: Naval War College 2001), 6.

^v Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department, in keeping with the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, encourages the use of "Five Questions" taken from Joint Pub 3.0 to help Operational Commanders determine the strategic goal in response to a developing crisis: 1) What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends) 2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways) 3) How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means) 4) What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions? 5) What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC's exit strategy? In this paper the first and last questions, referred to as 'question one' and 'question five,' are examined.

^{vi} Michael Handel, Masters of War (London and Portland: Frank Cass 2001), 110.

^{vii} Limited wars, for the purposes of this paper, are defined as analogous to the concept of "Small War" contained in the 1940 edition of the Small Wars Manual: "The term "Small War" is often a vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations. As applied to the United States, small wars are operations under taken under executive authority, wherein military forces combine with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unsteady, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation." Further, in this paper limited war and limited conflict are used interchangeably.

^{viii} Professor David Chandler, RADM, USN (Ret) presented the analogy of a bridge to describe the progression from war to peace (or from pre-hostilities to hostilities, then on to post hostilities) in his introduction to Joint Military Operations Course Foundations in March 2002 at the Naval War College, Newport, RI.

^{ix} Operation POWER PACK was the 1965-66 U.S. intervention into the Dominican Republic. It is used here because conditions for the 'steady state' were successfully planned for and produced.

^x Based generally on the Six Phases of Confrontation/Conflict contained in Colonel Bruce B. G. Clarke's seminal volume on war termination entitled Conflict Termination: A Rational Model, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA., 1992.

^{xi} The greatest possibility of escalation occurs during hostilities phase -- escalation of either the means employed, or the ways that such means are employed. In classic limited war terms, one can say that there is a change in the weapons used, the targets engaged, the geographic area of the hostilities or the objectives sought.

^{xii} During this phase at least one of the parties to the confrontation still perceives it in military terms. If the quarrel cannot move towards some form of nonviolent resolution, it can return to the hostility phase provided. However, once the use, or consideration of military means ceases, the hostilities phase yields to post-hostilities phase.

^{xiii} Vego, 637.

^{xiv} Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989), 582.

^{xv} While beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that Operational Commanders would be well served if our DoD transformation included force structure, organization and equipment, and doctrinal enhancements focused on making the operational transformation from conflict to steady state during limited wars more effective in the future than it has been in the past. As we become "lighter and equally or more lethal" the fragile movement from war to peace in the post-hostilities phase of conflict should be addressed in transformation plans.

^{xvi} William Morris, ed. The American Heritage Dictionary (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1999), 1364.

^{xvii} Leon Rios, "Seeking a Final Victory: Creating Conditions for Conflict Resolution," (Unpublished Paper, Carlisle Barracks: Army War College 1993), 52.

^{xviii} Michael R Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Canada: Little and Brown 1994), 488.

^{xix} Alexander M. Walczak, "Conflict Termination: Transitioning From Warrior to Constable: A Primer," (Unpublished paper Carlisle Barracks: Army War College 1997), 5.

^{xx} Ibid, 8.

^{xxi} Ibid, 9.

^{xxii} Ibid, 9.

^{xxiii} Handel, 16.

^{xxiv} Major Peterson The Nature of War and Campaign Design, (Unpublished paper, Carlisle Barracks: Army War College 1997), 24.

^{xxv} John T. Fishel, "Civil-Military Operations and the War for Political Legitimacy in Latin America, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implication of Civil-Military Actions," (Unpublished paper, Carlisle Barracks: Army War College 1998), 41.

^{xxvi} Ibid, 41.

^{xxvii} Clausewitz, 80.

^{xxviii} Handel, xxi.

^{xxix} Bruce B. G. Clarke identifies six phases of conflict in his book Conflict Termination: A Rational Model: Dispute, pre-hostility, hostilities, post-hostilities, dispute, and settlement. This paper generally follows his construct but adds a final phase, called steady state, to distinguish the sixth state from the end of the conflict. The steady state is a beginning, not an end state.

^{xxx} Donald P. Darnell, Jr. "War Termination: Winning the War and Winning the Peace – What's a CINC to do?" (Unpublished paper Newport RI: Naval War College 2001), 8.

^{xxxi} Joint Pub 5-2.20. Joint Task Force Planning and Guidance and Procedures, 13 January 1999. IX-54.

While the validity of the listed considerations in this section are not disputed, these considerations should be planned for before war termination planning. They should be the foundation of the initial deliberate or crisis planning because the steady peace and "return to the family of nations" are common elements of the strategic goal.

^{xxxii} The Red Cross principles are humanity, equality, due proportion, impartiality, neutrality, independence, universality (multiple sources).

^{xxxiii} Lawrence Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966 (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 1998), 178.

^{xxxiv} Ibid, 179.

^{xxxv} David B. Haiht, "Operation Just Cause: Foreshadowing Example of Joint Vision 2010 Concepts in Practice," (Unpublished paper Newport RI: Naval War College 1998), 17.

^{xxxvi} Yates, 180.

^{xxxvii} The information area of influence is clearly in the realm of Public Affairs (PA) and psychological operations (PSYOPS) as it involves the activities directed towards community relations, public information and command information. The emphasis that differentiates it from PA per se is that which is placed on the concept of non-lethal operational fires in a post-hostilities environment.

^{xxxviii} Fishel, 45.

^{xxxix} Ronald Cole, Operation URGENT FURY: Grenada (Washington DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1997), 50-54.

^{xl} Ibid, 55.

^{xli} Fishel, 44.

^{xliixliixlii} Fishel, 45.

Bibliography

- Bade, Bruce C. "War Termination: Why We Don't Plan for It." Essays on Strategy XII. Edited by John N. Petrie. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.
- Black, Richard and Vaughan Robinson, ed. Geography and Refugees: Patterns and Processes of Change. London and New York: Belhaven Press, 1993.
- Blandon, Francisco A. El Salvador: An Example for Conflict Resolution. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1995.
- Boomer, General Walter E., Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, Admiral Stanley A. Arthur, and General Charles A. Horner. "Ten Years After." Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2001): 61-65.
- Brown, Sheryl J. and Kimber M. Schraub, eds. Resolving Third World Conflict Challenges for a New Era. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1992.
- Clarke, Bruce B.G. "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model." Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992.
- Clarke, Bruce B.G. "Conflict Termination: What Does it Mean to Win?" Military Review, November 1992, 85-86.
- Clarke, Bruce B.G. "End-State Planning: The Somalia Case. In Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, ed. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson, 49-69. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Cline, Lawrence E. "Defending the End: Decision Making in Terminating the Persian Gulf War." Comparative Strategy 17, no. 4 (October-December 1998): 363-80.
- Cole, Ronald H. Operation URGENT FURY, The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada. Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC: 1997.
- Dalbey, Steven W. The March to Baghdad: Did We Stop Too Soon? Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997.

DePauw, John W. and George A. Lutz. Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1990.

“Exit Strategy.” Washington Post, 28 September 1997, C6: 1-2. (microfilm)

“Exit the Exit Strategy.” Washington Post, 19 December 1997, A24: 1-2.

Fishel, John T. "Civil-Military Operations and the War for Political Legitimacy in Latin America, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implication of Civil-Military Actions," (Unpublished paper, Carlisle Barracks: Army War College 1998)

FM-3.0. Operations. Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, 2001.

Foster, Mary L. and Robert A. Rubenstein, eds. Peace and War: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Transaction Books; Oxford, 1986.

Friedman, Thomas L. “Exit Strategy.” New York Times, 24 April 1996, A21: 5-6.

Gilpin, Michael D. Exit Strategy: The New Dimension in Operational Planning. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997.

Goodman, Allan E. and Sandra C. Bogart, eds. Making Peace: The United States and Conflict Resolution. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992.

Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Little, Brown and Company: Canada, 1994.

Hagel, Chuck. “Victory: The Only Exit Strategy.” Washington Post, 31 March 1999, A29: 1-4.

Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. Frank Cass Publishers, London, England 2001.

Hutchison, John F. Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross. Boulder, CO: Westview: 1996.

Joint After Action Report. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, VA: 1995.

Joint Pub 3.0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 10 September 2001.

Joint Pub 3-08. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. Volumes I and II. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 9 October 1996.

Joint Pub 3-13. Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 9 October 1998.

Joint Pub 5.0. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 13 April 1995.

Joint Pub 5-00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 13 January 1999.

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Joint Warfighting Center: Fort Monroe, VA, 1997.

Lademan, William J. "War Termination: The Confluence of Strategy and Policy." Unpublished Joint Military Operations Department Paper, Naval War College, 1988.

Matthews, Richard E. Defining the Operational End State: Operation Desert Storm. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies, 1996.

Moore, Jonathan, ed. Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Lanham, Maryland, 1998.

Osterman, Joseph L. "Then and Now: A Strategic Primer for Post-Conflict Activities." U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA., 2000.

Peterson, Major Steven W. The Nature of War and Campaign Design. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994.

Pictet, Jean S. Red Cross Principles. International Committee of the Red Cross: Geneva, Switzerland, 1966.

Planning and Execution of Conflict Termination. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University. Air Command and Staff College, 1995.

Schellenberg, James A. Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.

Schroeder, Anita. International Peace Operations and Conflict Resolution. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University. Air War College, 1995.

Schwanz, John. War Termination: The Application of Operational Art to Negotiating Peace. Newport RI: Naval War College, 1996.

Small Wars Manual. Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington DC: 1940.

Soucy, Robert R. "War Termination and Joint Planning." Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1995, 95-101.

Strednansky, Major Susan E. Balancing the Trinity: The Fine Art of Conflict Termination. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University. School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996.

Sullivan, Ricki Lynn. "The Operational Planner and War Termination." Unpublished Joint Military Operations Department Paper, Naval War College, June 1993.


Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith. New York: The Oxford University Press, 1971.

Walczak, Colonel Alexander M. Conflict Termination - - Transitioning From Warrior to Constable: A Primer. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992.

Walter, Barbara F. The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail. Department of Political Science, University of Chicago: Chicago, IL, 1994.

Weinberger, Caspar W. "Losing Track of the Main Objective of War." New York Times, 12 April 1999, !25: 2-6. A restatement of the "Weinberger Doctrine."

Yates, Lawrence A. Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965 – 1966. Combat Studies Institute: Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 1988.



The Bridge From Conflict To The 'Steady State'

Note: This chart depicts the phases of limited war and the bridge that Operational Commanders should build to reach the steady state. The bridge is built on the base of joint doctrine and is supported by the Operational Commander's judgment. The bridge is constructed using areas of influence to reach the strategic goal. The conditions the Operational Commander should produce, preserve, and/or protect are identified by early assessment of the requirements for the long-term steady state – "writing the last chapter first."

APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO JOINT DOCTRINE

A. Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine For Joint Operations

1. Page xiii; Key Planning Considerations, change the paragraph to read:

Key Planning Considerations include: mission, commander's intent, *factors that will affect the progress from conflict to peace*, commander's critical items of information, concept of operations, targeting, support, air apportionment, countering air and missile threats, space support operations, concept of logistics, force protection, environmental considerations, and command, control, communications, and computer systems.

2. Page xiii; Considerations Before Combat; add to end of paragraph:

Operational Commanders should evaluate what informational, domestic leadership, and infrastructure requirements will be necessary to transform from combat operations to post hostilities activities with assurance.

3. Page xiv; Military Operations Other Than War, change the third paragraph to read:

Planning considerations for MOOTW include interagency coordination, command and control, intelligence and information collection, constraints and restraints, training and education, post conflict operations *and the conditions required for a stable peace*, and redeployment to other contingencies.

4. Question "one" change to read:

What military, and related political and social, conditions must be produced, *preserved, and/or protected* in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

B. Joint Publication 5-0: Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations

1. Page III-8; PARAGRAPH 6.d; Add to end of paragraph:

Further, the plan review should ensure that meticulous and detailed planning has been devoted to the post hostilities phase, appropriate interagency and multinational coordination has been made, and that the plan is in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain operational and strategic objectives.

C. Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

1. Add definition:

DESIRED END STATE: The broadly expressed political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, ethnic, humanitarian, and other conditions that the highest political leadership of national or alliance/coalition forces wants in a given theater after the end of hostilities.¹

2. Add definition:

STEADY STATE: The final phase in successful limited war, the steady state, is the “rest of the story.” It is the long-term stable state of affairs in the post-war region. The achievement of the desired end state begins this phase, however the stable state is what the affected region looks like months, and even years, after the limited war has concluded. If the desired end state is the situation “...after the end of the hostilities,” then the stable state is the beginning and continuation of relative harmony between the belligerents resulting in what Clausewitz might have described as “final victory.”

¹ Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare (Newport, RI: Naval War College 2000)